COLD RELIC: Google Warns of Russian Hacker Phishing Attacks

Google warns that Russian-linked COLD RELIC hackers are exploiting stolen accounts, employee data and trusted identities to launch targeted phishing attacks.

Published: 4 hours ago

By Ray Ashish

COLD RELIC: Google Warns of Russian Hacker Phishing Attacks
COLD RELIC: Google Warns of Russian Hacker Phishing Attacks

A Russian-linked cyber espionage group known as COLD RELIC is continuing to target government-related organizations, businesses and other strategically important institutions through sophisticated phishing and malware campaigns, according to a new warning from Google. The threat actor is using stolen account credentials and information collected during previous intrusions to make subsequent attacks more convincing and difficult to detect.

Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has highlighted a particularly concerning element of the group’s operations: instead of treating each successful intrusion as an isolated opportunity to steal information, attackers are turning compromised accounts into stepping stones for additional attacks. Emails, employee directories, contact lists and internal organizational details can all become resources for impersonating trusted individuals and approaching new victims.

The findings reveal how a single compromised cloud account can potentially expose an organization’s wider network of professional relationships. Once attackers obtain enough internal information, they can use legitimate identities and familiar communication patterns to make phishing messages appear authentic.

Google says COLD RELIC remains active and has observed evidence of additional phishing activity. The campaign highlights why organizations need stronger identity protection, phishing-resistant authentication and continuous monitoring of cloud accounts rather than relying on passwords and conventional security notifications alone.

Who Is COLD RELIC? Understanding the Russian-Linked Espionage Group

COLD RELIC is a cyber espionage threat actor associated with Russian state interests. The group is also tracked under several other names, including COLDRIVER, UNC4057, Star Blizzard, Callisto and Gossamer Bear. Different Cybersecurity organizations may use different identifiers when tracking the same threat activity.

According to Google’s reporting, the group has operated for more than a decade and has primarily targeted individuals and organizations holding information of strategic or political interest to the Russian government.

Its reported targets include:

  • Government officials: Individuals who may have access to sensitive political, diplomatic or administrative information.
  • Defense contractors: Organizations connected to defense operations, technology and government supply chains.
  • Non-governmental organizations: Groups involved in policy, advocacy and other activities that may attract intelligence interest.
  • Other strategically important organizations: Businesses and institutions whose communications or internal information could help identify additional targets.

Google describes the group’s operations as sophisticated phishing and malware campaigns intended to obtain information with strategic or political relevance to the Russian government.

The United States Department of Justice has also publicly associated COLDRIVER with Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). This connection places the group’s activity within the broader context of Russian-linked intelligence operations, although individual incidents still need to be assessed using the available technical evidence.

What makes the latest findings particularly important is not simply the group’s ability to steal credentials. It is how COLD RELIC reportedly uses information gathered from one victim to build convincing attacks against another organization.

How COLD RELIC Uses One Compromised Account to Reach New Victims

Traditional phishing campaigns often rely on generic messages designed to trick as many recipients as possible. These emails may contain suspicious links, unexpected attachments or requests to verify account information.

COLD RELIC’s reported approach is more targeted. Once the group gains access to an organization’s digital environment, it collects information that can help establish trust with people and businesses connected to the original victim.

That information may include employee names, professional email addresses, organizational relationships, contact directories, resumes and event schedules. Attackers can use these details to understand who communicates with whom and which individuals are likely to recognize a particular sender.

The group can then impersonate a legitimate employee or trusted contact when approaching another organization. A phishing message that appears to come from a known professional contact may be more convincing than an email from an unfamiliar sender.

This creates a chain of potential compromises:

  1. Initial intrusion: Attackers obtain access to an account belonging to a targeted organization.
  2. Information collection: They extract emails, contact lists, employee information and other internal records.
  3. Relationship mapping: The stolen information helps identify people and organizations connected to the original victim.
  4. Impersonation: Attackers use legitimate identities or familiar communication patterns to contact new targets.
  5. Follow-on phishing: New recipients are directed towards malicious links intended to steal credentials or authentication tokens.

The approach turns information theft into a tool for expanding access. A successful intrusion can therefore create opportunities for additional attacks long after the original account has been compromised.

Inside the First Mandiant Investigation: How Attackers Compromised a Cloud Super Admin

Google’s report describes two intrusions investigated by Mandiant, its cybersecurity incident response and threat intelligence business. Both incidents involved organizations based in the United States.

In the first investigation, attackers stole the credentials of a Super Admin account belonging to a targeted organization. A Super Admin account can have extensive administrative privileges within a cloud environment, potentially allowing its holder to access sensitive resources and manage important organizational settings.

The compromised account provided the attackers with an opportunity to enter the organization’s cloud productivity environment. However, the account had multi-factor authentication (MFA) enabled, meaning that a stolen password alone should not have been sufficient to complete the login process.

MFA Fatigue Helped the Attackers Get Access

Rather than relying exclusively on the stolen credentials, COLD RELIC reportedly used an approach known as MFA fatigue, also called push bombing.

In this technique, attackers repeatedly send authentication approval requests to a targeted user. The objective is to overwhelm the individual with notifications until they eventually approve one, either accidentally or simply to make the repeated interruptions stop.

Google’s investigation found that the attackers sent hundreds of authentication approval requests before the targeted user approved one.

This incident demonstrates an important weakness in certain authentication setups. MFA can significantly improve account security, but approval-based systems may still be vulnerable when users receive repeated requests and are not adequately prepared to recognise suspicious activity.

Once access was obtained, the attackers moved beyond the initial login and began collecting information from the organization’s cloud environment.

Attackers Extracted Data and Deleted Security Logs

According to the investigation, COLD RELIC downloaded information stored in the compromised cloud environment, exported employee lists and initiated a domain-wide data export.

The attackers also deleted security investigation and email audit logs in an apparent effort to conceal their activities. Removing or tampering with logs can make it more difficult for security teams to reconstruct an intrusion, identify which information was accessed and determine how the attackers moved through an environment.

The incident illustrates why organizations should protect their audit records separately from the accounts and systems that administrators use every day. If attackers obtain sufficiently powerful privileges, security information stored within the same environment may also become vulnerable.

For businesses, the consequences of a compromised administrator account can extend well beyond one employee’s mailbox. Depending on the permissions involved, attackers may gain access to organizational information, internal communications and data that can support future attacks.

How COLD RELIC Used Stolen Information to Attack Another Organization

The second incident described in Google’s report demonstrates how the information collected during an earlier intrusion could be reused against a different victim.

Approximately a year after the initial compromise, COLD RELIC reportedly impersonated an employee of the previously targeted organization and contacted another US-based organization. The attackers shared phishing links designed to steal login credentials and authentication tokens associated with Microsoft Entra ID.

Microsoft Entra ID is Microsoft’s cloud-based identity and access management platform. Organizations use it to manage user identities, authenticate employees and control access to connected applications and services.

Authentication tokens are particularly valuable to attackers because they can help establish access to services without repeatedly entering a password. Depending on the token type, its permissions and the security controls in place, stolen tokens may allow attackers to access accounts or resources as an authenticated user.

Google reported that the follow-on phishing attempt succeeded. The incident demonstrates how stolen organizational information can help attackers establish credibility with people who have no direct connection to the original intrusion.

Instead of sending an obviously suspicious message, the attackers could use the identity of someone associated with a legitimate business relationship. This makes the campaign more difficult to identify through basic checks of the sender’s name or familiarity with the organization.

Why Stolen Contact Lists and Internal Emails Are So Valuable

The COLD RELIC campaign highlights an often-overlooked aspect of cybersecurity: information that does not appear especially sensitive can become extremely valuable when combined with other stolen data.

An employee directory, for example, may not contain passwords or financial records. However, it can reveal the names of senior staff, reporting relationships and departments. Email archives may provide even more useful details, including communication styles, ongoing projects and the names of external contacts.

Attackers can use these details to construct believable messages that refer to real people, business relationships or organizational activities.

Several types of information can support this approach:

  • Employee directories: Help identify staff members, managers and individuals with administrative responsibilities.
  • Email conversations: Reveal professional relationships, communication patterns and ongoing discussions.
  • Contact lists: Provide potential targets outside the original organization, including suppliers, partners and contractors.
  • Resumes and professional profiles: Offer information about employees’ roles, experience and organizational connections.
  • Event schedules: Help attackers create believable messages connected to meetings, conferences or other activities.

When combined, these records can provide enough context to make a fraudulent message appear to be part of an ordinary business conversation.

This is why organizations should not assume that an incident is low-risk simply because attackers have not immediately stolen financial records or intellectual property. Contact information and internal communications can have significant intelligence value.

Google Warns COLD RELIC Is Still Active

Google’s warning is not limited to historical intrusions. The Threat Intelligence Group says it continues to track the group’s activities and observed evidence of new phishing attacks earlier in November.

The continued activity suggests that organizations previously exposed to the group should not assume that the danger has disappeared simply because an initial incident has been contained.

Even after attackers lose access to a compromised account, information collected during the intrusion may remain useful. Stolen contact lists, email conversations and employee identities can potentially support later impersonation attempts against connected organizations.

This makes incident response more complicated. Security teams need to consider not only whether the original account has been secured, but also whether stolen information could be used to target employees, suppliers, customers or business partners.

Organizations that have experienced a cloud account compromise should therefore assess the wider impact of the incident and consider warning relevant contacts about possible impersonation attempts.

How Organizations Can Protect Themselves Against COLD RELIC

Google recommends strengthening authentication security and improving monitoring across cloud environments. The measures are relevant not only to organizations concerned about COLD RELIC but also to businesses facing broader phishing, credential theft and account takeover threats.

1. Use Phishing-Resistant Multi-Factor Authentication

Organizations should move beyond authentication methods that depend on users approving repeated push notifications. Google recommends phishing-resistant MFA, which makes it substantially harder for attackers to reuse stolen passwords or trick employees into approving fraudulent login attempts.

Recommended options include:

  • Hardware security keys: Physical authentication devices, such as Google Titan security keys, that support phishing-resistant authentication.
  • FIDO2 and WebAuthn: Standards that enable strong authentication using cryptographic credentials tied to the legitimate website or service.
  • Passkeys: Passwordless credentials designed to provide secure authentication across supported devices and platforms.

These methods offer stronger protection against conventional credential phishing because authentication is linked to the legitimate service rather than relying on a user simply approving an unexpected request.

2. Monitor Suspicious Passkey and Device Registrations

Attackers who gain access to an account may attempt to register additional authentication methods or devices. If successful, these registrations could provide another way to access the account even after the original password has been changed.

Organizations should monitor changes to authentication settings, newly registered devices and unexpected passkey additions. Any unusual registration should be investigated, particularly when it follows suspicious login activity or an MFA-related incident.

3. Revoke Existing Sessions and OAuth Permissions

Changing a compromised account’s password may not be enough to remove every form of attacker access. Existing sessions or application permissions could remain active, depending on the platform and the nature of the compromise.

Google recommends revoking active sessions and OAuth permissions when responding to suspected account compromises.

OAuth permissions allow applications to access certain account resources after a user or administrator grants authorization. If attackers misuse these permissions, they may retain access through connected applications even when the original login credentials have been changed.

Incident response teams should therefore review connected applications, remove suspicious authorizations and invalidate active sessions where appropriate.

4. Monitor Logins From Residential Proxy Networks

Google also advises businesses to monitor suspicious login activity originating from residential proxy networks, which can make malicious traffic appear to come from ordinary consumer internet connections.

Unlike some traditional hosting or data-centre infrastructure, residential proxies route traffic through IP addresses associated with residential internet connections. This can make it harder for security teams to identify suspicious activity using basic location or IP reputation checks alone.

Organizations should examine unusual login patterns, unfamiliar devices, unexpected geographical changes and other signals that may indicate account misuse. A residential IP address should not automatically be treated as malicious, but it should be considered alongside other authentication and behavioural indicators.

5. Protect Cloud Audit Logs and Administrative Accounts

The reported deletion of investigation and email audit logs highlights the importance of protecting security records from compromised administrator accounts.

Businesses should consider storing critical audit information in systems with separate access controls, restricted administrative permissions and appropriate retention policies. This can make it more difficult for an intruder to erase evidence after gaining access to a cloud environment.

Administrative accounts should also receive additional protection. Organizations can limit the number of users with high-level privileges, require stronger authentication and regularly review who has permission to access sensitive cloud resources.

Why the COLD RELIC Campaign Matters Beyond Its Direct Victims

The most significant lesson from Google’s findings is that a successful cyber intrusion can create risks for organizations that were not part of the original attack.

When attackers steal internal emails and contact information, they may gain access to a map of an organization’s professional relationships. That information can then be used to approach suppliers, contractors, partner companies and other connected institutions.

This creates a wider security challenge for organizations that rely on cloud collaboration and interconnected business networks. A company may have strong internal security controls but still receive convincing phishing messages from an account belonging to a trusted external contact that has already been compromised.

For this reason, cybersecurity cannot depend entirely on recognising suspicious-looking emails. Employees should verify unexpected requests involving login credentials, authentication approvals, sensitive documents or account access through an independent communication channel.

Security teams should also treat compromised business relationships as a potential source of follow-on attacks. If a trusted partner reports an account breach, organizations may need to review recent communications and warn employees about messages that could be impersonating that partner.

The Bigger Cybersecurity Lesson: Identity Is a Critical Attack Surface

COLD RELIC’s reported methods reflect a wider shift in cyber espionage and account takeover activity. Attackers do not always need to exploit a software vulnerability when they can obtain legitimate credentials, manipulate authentication processes or misuse trusted identities.

Cloud services have made it easier for employees and organizations to collaborate across geographical boundaries. However, this convenience also means that compromised accounts can expose large amounts of information and provide access to systems used by multiple departments.

Identity security is therefore becoming as important as traditional network protection. Passwords, authentication methods, device registrations, application permissions and active sessions all need to be monitored as part of a broader security strategy.

The COLD RELIC investigation also demonstrates why incident response must extend beyond the immediate victim. When stolen information can be reused to target new organizations, containing the original intrusion is only one part of the process.

Google says it will continue tracking and disrupting the group’s infrastructure to protect cloud users. For organizations, the immediate priority is to strengthen phishing-resistant authentication, secure administrative accounts, protect audit logs and investigate suspicious identity activity before attackers can turn one compromised account into a wider campaign.

The threat is a reminder that modern cyber espionage is not always about breaking into a single system. Increasingly, it is about exploiting the trust and connections that link entire organizations together.

FAQs

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