ECI Withholds SIR Software Details Citing RTI Exemptions

The Election Commission of India (ECI) has declined to disclose the name and version of the software it used to identify errors and anomalies in electoral rolls during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), citing commercial confidence, trade secrets and intellectual property protections under the Right to Information (RTI) Act.

In its response to an RTI application filed by social activist MA Mujeeb Ayyub of Karimnagar, Telangana, the poll panel also said that no new software had been developed or procured specifically for the SIR exercise. It maintained that electoral registration officers (EROs) remain responsible for deciding whether an elector should be included in or excluded from the electoral roll based on facts and records.

The reply, dated October 16, comes amid scrutiny of the controversial voter-roll revision exercise and questions about how electoral data is processed, how anomalies are identified and what safeguards exist to prevent genuine voters from being incorrectly flagged.

The commission invoked different provisions of the RTI Act to address Ayyub’s questions. It cited Section 8(1)(d) to withhold the software’s name and version, Section 2(f) to reject several questions it characterised as requests for clarification, and Section 8(1)(g) in response to a query about the authority reviewing flagged anomalies.

Why the Election Commission Withheld Software Details

Ayyub asked the ECI to identify the software, application or artificial intelligence platform used to detect errors and inconsistencies in voter data during the SIR process. He also sought the specific software version used by the commission.

In response, the ECI relied on Section 8(1)(d) of the RTI Act, which provides an exemption for information involving commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property where disclosure could harm a third party’s competitive position.

The commission therefore declined to reveal the software’s name and version, arguing that the requested details fell within the protected categories specified under the law.

The response did not identify the software in question or provide technical details about the system used during the revision exercise. As a result, the information supplied in the reply does not establish which specific application or platform was responsible for identifying potential errors in electoral records.

The ECI did, however, state that no new software had been developed or procured for the SIR exercise. This was a separate clarification about the procurement and development of software for the exercise, rather than a disclosure of the platform’s identity or version.

ECI Says Electoral Registration Officers Make Final Decisions

Alongside its response on software, the commission emphasised the statutory role of electoral registration officers in preparing and revising voter lists.

“The ERO of the concerned constituency is the statutory authority responsible for the preparation and revision of electoral roll of that constituency,” the poll panel said.

The ECI also maintained that decisions about including or excluding an elector are made by the relevant ERO on the basis of facts and records.

This distinction is central to understanding the commission’s response. Identifying an anomaly in a voter record and deciding whether that record warrants a change are not necessarily the same process. The ECI’s reply places the statutory responsibility for electoral-roll decisions with the ERO, but the information provided does not fully describe the technical workflow that may precede an officer’s decision.

Ayyub’s questions sought details about how the software operates, how flagged records are handled and what procedures govern decisions involving individual voters. The commission did not provide a detailed account of that workflow in its RTI response.

RTI Applicant Asked About AI, Automated Flagging and Safeguards

The RTI application went beyond asking for the software’s name. Ayyub sought information about whether the system automatically flags voter records for verification, correction or deletion and what steps follow when a record is identified as potentially inconsistent.

He also asked whether artificial intelligence, machine learning, predictive analytics or automated decision-support tools were used at any stage of the SIR exercise.

Another part of the application focused on safeguards against false positives and wrongful flagging. These questions were intended to establish what protections were in place to prevent genuine electors from being incorrectly identified as having errors or inconsistencies in their records.

Ayyub additionally sought clarification on which authority reviews or approves flagged anomalies before action is taken on an elector’s record.

In response to the questions about automatic flagging, the use of AI or machine learning and safeguards against wrongful flagging, the ECI said the information sought amounted to a request for “clarification” and did not fall within the definition of information under Section 2(f) of the RTI Act.

Section 2(f) defines the types of information that can be sought under the legislation. By relying on this provision, the commission declined to provide the explanations requested in those parts of the application.

The response, as described, does not establish whether AI, machine learning or predictive analytics were used during the SIR process. Nor does it provide a detailed explanation of whether records were automatically flagged or what specific safeguards were applied to prevent errors.

Consequently, the questions about automated processing and protections for genuine voters remain unanswered in the information disclosed through this RTI reply.

ECI Cites Safety and Confidentiality Exemption on Review Authority

Ayyub’s question about who reviews flagged anomalies before action is taken on a voter’s record received a different response from the commission.

The ECI cited Section 8(1)(g) of the RTI Act, which exempts information where disclosure could endanger a person’s life or physical safety or identify the source of information given in confidence for law-enforcement or security purposes.

The commission also referred to Sections 13B(1) and 13B(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, to reiterate that the ERO for the relevant Assembly constituency is the statutory authority responsible for preparing and revising the electoral roll.

The reference to the ERO clarified which official holds statutory responsibility for the electoral-roll process. However, the response did not provide a detailed description of the internal review arrangements for individual anomalies or explain the specific sequence of checks that takes place before an elector’s record is changed.

The distinction matters because the authority legally responsible for an electoral roll and the technical process used to identify questionable records are separate aspects of the broader revision exercise. The ECI’s response addressed the former by identifying the ERO’s statutory role but did not disclose all the technical and procedural information sought by the applicant.

Former Chief Election Commissioner OP Rawat Advises Appeal

Reacting to the RTI response, former Chief Election Commissioner OP Rawat said the applicant should file an appeal with the competent authorities to seek answers to the questions he believes the ECI has not addressed.

“This is a legal matter and the applicant must file an appeal to the competent authorities to seek answers to questions ECI is evading,” Rawat said.

His remarks point to the appeal process as a potential next step for an applicant who disagrees with the commission’s interpretation of the RTI Act or its decision to withhold particular information.

An appeal would allow the applicant to challenge the response through the relevant statutory mechanism. The supplied information does not establish whether Ayyub has filed an appeal or whether any appellate authority has reviewed the ECI’s decision.

SIR Exercise Faces Scrutiny Over Voter-List Changes

The software-related RTI response comes against the backdrop of wider scrutiny of the Special Intensive Revision exercise, which has drawn criticism over changes to electoral rolls and concerns about the treatment of voter records.

The supplied report states that 130 million names had already been deleted from electoral rolls across India during the SIR process. That figure forms part of the wider debate surrounding the scale of the revision exercise and the need to understand how names are retained, removed or corrected.

Questions about the software used in the process have particular relevance because the RTI applicant sought to understand how errors and inconsistencies are identified and whether automated tools play any role. However, the ECI’s response does not establish that software or AI systems independently make final decisions about whether an individual should remain on the electoral roll.

Instead, the commission has stated that EROs are the statutory authorities responsible for electoral-roll preparation and revision, with decisions based on facts and records. The response leaves open questions about how technical systems may support the process and what checks are applied before a flagged record reaches the relevant officer.

Report Raises Questions About Internal Access to ECI Software

The controversy also follows an investigation by The Indian Express, which reported that election commissioners SS Sandhu and Vivek Joshi recorded written dissents and objections at least 14 times between November 2025 and August 2026. The report also said that the commissioners wrote to the cabinet secretary.

The investigation further alleged that election officials found their access to the Election Commission’s software curtailed by the central IT team.

The ECI responded that differing views and observations were a normal part of deliberations. It also said that all its digital platforms operated under strict data-security protocols.

These reports concern questions about internal processes, access to digital systems and institutional deliberations. They are separate from the specific legal grounds cited in the October 16 RTI response, and the allegations should not be treated as independently established findings merely because they were reported.

Taken together, the issues have increased attention on how electoral technology is managed and how responsibility is distributed between technical teams and officials who oversee voter lists. The available information does not, by itself, establish that any reported restriction on software access affected a particular voter’s record or changed the outcome of an individual electoral-roll decision.

ERONET Portal Also Draws Attention in West Bengal SIR

An earlier report by Hindustan Times in February said some problems associated with the SIR exercise in West Bengal had roots in the Election Commission’s Electoral Registration Officer Network, or ERONET, portal, citing senior officials from the poll body’s IT division.

ERONET is the portal identified in that report in connection with electoral-registration work. The report adds another dimension to questions about the digital systems used in voter-roll preparation and revision.

However, the supplied information does not detail the specific technical problems attributed to ERONET or establish that the portal was the software referred to in Ayyub’s RTI application. The ECI’s reply did not name the software or application used to identify anomalies during the SIR exercise, so the two matters should not be assumed to concern the same system without further evidence.

What the RTI Reply Establishes and What Remains Unknown

The ECI’s October 16 response establishes several points about its stated position. The commission said it had not developed or procured new software for the SIR exercise, declined to disclose the software’s name and version under Section 8(1)(d), and rejected several requests for explanations under Section 2(f). It also invoked Section 8(1)(g) when responding to the question about who reviews flagged anomalies.

The commission reiterated that the ERO for the relevant constituency is the statutory authority responsible for preparing and revising the electoral roll, and that inclusion or exclusion decisions are based on facts and records.

Several technical details remain unclear from the reply. The identity and version of the software have not been disclosed in the response described. The commission has not provided the requested details on automatic flagging, the use of AI or machine learning, safeguards against false positives or the precise workflow followed after an anomaly is detected.

The response also does not establish whether the applicant has pursued an appeal or whether any subsequent decision has altered the commission’s position.

As scrutiny of the SIR exercise continues, the central issue raised by the RTI application is how the ECI identifies potentially problematic voter records while ensuring that statutory decisions remain grounded in facts and records. The commission has outlined its legal grounds for withholding or declining some of the requested information, while the applicant’s questions about the technical process and safeguards have not been answered in detail in the response provided.