ICC Crisis Deepens as Five Countries Move to Withdraw

The International Criminal Court is facing one of the most serious political challenges in its history as the United States intensifies pressure on its members to leave the institution and five countries announce plans to withdraw from the Rome Statute within roughly a year.

Venezuela and Chad are the latest states to begin the process of leaving the Hague-based court, following Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The withdrawals have come as the ICC faces criticism from some governments over alleged selective justice, direct pressure from Washington and a leadership crisis following the removal of chief prosecutor Karim Khan.

The developments do not mean the court is shutting down, nor do they automatically end investigations into alleged crimes committed while countries were members. Under the Rome Statute, withdrawal generally does not erase obligations or jurisdiction relating to conduct that occurred while a state was still a party.

That distinction is becoming increasingly important. The ICC is losing members at the same time as it is handling major investigations and cases involving countries that remain within its jurisdictional framework. Ukraine, meanwhile, became the court’s 125th state party in January 2025, illustrating that the institution’s trajectory is not simply one of universal retreat.

Why the ICC is under pressure now

The current crisis is being driven by several forces at once.

The United States has launched an aggressive campaign against the ICC, particularly following the court’s actions involving senior Israeli officials and its broader investigations concerning US personnel in Afghanistan. Washington is not a party to the Rome Statute and has long rejected the court’s attempts to exercise jurisdiction over American nationals in certain circumstances.

At the same time, several African governments led by military authorities have renewed longstanding criticism that the ICC has disproportionately targeted African conflicts and leaders.

These pressures have converged with an institutional crisis at the court itself. The removal of prosecutor Karim Khan has created an additional leadership challenge precisely when the ICC is facing a series of politically sensitive investigations and arrest warrants.

The result is a court under pressure from both outside and inside the Rome Statute system.

Washington is encouraging countries to leave the ICC

The Trump administration has moved beyond criticism and sanctions to a broader effort aimed at weakening the ICC’s international support base.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington was pursuing a campaign to dismantle what the administration considers a threat to US sovereignty. The United States has urged the ICC’s member states to withdraw, threatened organisations working with the court and imposed sanctions on ICC personnel.

The administration has also targeted officials associated with the court over actions involving Israeli leaders and investigations related to US activities in Afghanistan.

Washington’s message to other governments is particularly significant because the United States remains a major provider of military, economic and diplomatic support to many countries that participate in the ICC system.

That creates a difficult choice for governments: whether to defend the principle of an independent international court at the risk of diplomatic tension with Washington, or prioritise their relationship with the United States.

Chad directly linked its withdrawal to US pressure

Chad’s decision offers the clearest indication yet that the American campaign may be influencing the choices of some governments.

Chadian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Sabre Fadoul said his government had discussed the ICC during a phone call with a US official on July 23. According to Chad’s account, the American side expressed concerns about the institution and asked the country to reconsider its membership.

Chad announced its decision to begin withdrawing four days later.

That does not establish that US pressure was the only reason for the move. Chad also criticised the ICC’s effectiveness and approach to international justice. But the explicit reference to the conversation with Washington makes the episode particularly important in assessing the reach of the US campaign.

For the court, the larger question is whether Chad’s decision becomes a model other countries follow.

Five countries have now announced withdrawals

Within a relatively short period, five countries have announced plans to leave the Rome Statute: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Venezuela and Chad.

The three West African states were the first to announce their decisions in the recent wave. Venezuela and Chad followed in 2026.

The withdrawals do not take effect immediately. The Rome Statute provides for a one-year period after formal notification, meaning states remain subject to relevant treaty obligations during that period.

This delay also gives governments and the ICC time to assess cases, clarify jurisdictional questions and potentially reconsider their decisions.

The practical impact will therefore depend not only on how many governments announce withdrawals but also on whether those withdrawals are ultimately completed.

Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso accuse the ICC of selective justice

The West African withdrawals are rooted in a different set of grievances from Washington’s campaign.

Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are governed by military juntas that have sharply altered their foreign-policy relationships since taking power. Their governments have accused the ICC of applying international justice selectively and disproportionately targeting African countries.

The three states described the ICC as an instrument of what they characterised as neocolonial repression.

The criticism reflects a dispute that has surrounded the court for much of its existence. The ICC’s earliest investigations and cases were concentrated heavily on Africa, creating a perception in some African political circles that the institution was more willing to prosecute African leaders than powerful figures from other parts of the world.

The ICC has argued that many of those African situations were referred to the court by the countries themselves or by the UN Security Council, rather than being imposed entirely from outside.

The political shift in the Sahel is also important

The recent African withdrawals cannot be separated from the broader geopolitical transformation in the Sahel.

Military governments in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have moved away from some of their traditional Western partnerships and expanded relations with Russia and other alternative partners.

That realignment changes the political context in which international institutions are viewed.

For governments seeking greater distance from France, the United States and other Western powers, the ICC can become associated with the international political order they are trying to challenge.

Mel O’Brien of the University of Western Australia has argued that authoritarian leaders may also have a domestic reason for resisting international accountability mechanisms if they fear scrutiny of abuses committed under their rule.

These two motivations sovereignty and accountability can overlap even when governments publicly focus on institutional criticism.

ICC criticism over Africa is decades old

The current crisis is not the first time African governments have challenged the court.

Burundi became the first country to leave the ICC in 2017, after accusing the institution of disproportionately targeting Africa. The court had opened an investigation into Burundi earlier that year.

South Africa and Gambia also announced plans to withdraw in 2016-17, although both later reversed those decisions and remained within the Rome Statute system.

The history is important because it shows that withdrawal announcements do not always become permanent exits.

It also demonstrates that the ICC’s membership has always been politically contested. Governments may support the idea of international criminal justice in principle while objecting when investigations begin to affect their own officials or national sovereignty.

Hungary showed that governments can change course

Hungary provides another example of how quickly the political direction of a country can change.

Budapest announced in 2025 that it would withdraw from the Rome Statute. After a change in government, however, Hungary’s Parliament voted to remain.

The episode highlights an important point about treaty membership: withdrawal decisions reflect the policy of a government at a particular moment and can be reconsidered by a later administration.

That means the current wave of departures should not automatically be interpreted as a permanent rejection of the ICC by those societies.

Domestic elections and changes in leadership can reverse foreign-policy choices just as they can reverse positions on other international institutions.

Leaving the ICC does not erase past crimes

One of the biggest misconceptions surrounding the current crisis is that leaving the ICC immediately ends the court’s authority over a country’s past conduct.

It does not.

Withdrawal from the Rome Statute is not retroactive. The court can retain jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed while a state was a party to the treaty, subject to the applicable jurisdictional rules.

This principle was reinforced after the Philippines withdrew from the Rome Statute in 2019. The withdrawal did not end the ICC’s examination of alleged crimes committed during the period when the Philippines was a state party.

The distinction protects the basic logic of international criminal accountability. Otherwise, a government could theoretically remove itself from the treaty after alleged crimes occurred and thereby attempt to eliminate the court’s jurisdiction over those acts.

The Philippines and the Duterte case illustrate the point

The Philippines is the clearest real-world example of why withdrawal does not necessarily stop an ICC investigation.

Former President Rodrigo Duterte withdrew the Philippines from the Rome Statute, but the ICC continued its work on allegations connected to the deadly anti-drug campaign conducted during his administration.

Duterte was arrested and surrendered to the ICC in March 2025. He is being held in the Netherlands and faces allegations involving crimes against humanity.

The case illustrates the difference between treaty membership and jurisdiction over past conduct. The Philippines may no longer be a state party, but the alleged acts under examination occurred during the period covered by the court’s jurisdiction.

That legal principle means the latest withdrawals are unlikely to immediately halt existing ICC investigations involving Venezuela, Chad or the other departing states.

Venezuela’s withdrawal will not simply erase the ICC investigation

Venezuela’s decision is particularly significant because the ICC has an ongoing situation involving alleged crimes by Venezuelan security forces under the government of former President Nicolás Maduro.

Venezuelan officials have accused the ICC of being politicised and of undermining national sovereignty. The government has argued that the institution has been used to deepen international inequalities rather than provide impartial justice.

But the legal consequences of withdrawal are narrower than the political announcement may suggest. The court’s jurisdiction over alleged conduct committed while Venezuela was bound by the Rome Statute is not automatically extinguished simply because Caracas begins the withdrawal process.

This gives the ICC an important degree of continuity even as its political relationship with the Venezuelan government deteriorates.

The ICC itself is going through a leadership crisis

The membership crisis has been accompanied by turmoil at the top of the institution.

Karim Khan was removed as ICC prosecutor after proceedings concerning allegations of serious misconduct. His departure has forced the court to begin the difficult process of selecting a new prosecutor at a time when its workload is already unusually heavy.

The leadership issue is politically sensitive because the prosecutor’s office sits at the centre of the ICC’s ability to investigate cases, request arrest warrants and determine prosecutorial priorities.

A leadership transition during a period of US sanctions, membership withdrawals and criticism from powerful governments creates additional uncertainty over how the court will defend its independence and maintain operational continuity.

US pressure has focused heavily on Israel-related cases

A major source of US hostility toward the ICC is the court’s action involving senior Israeli officials.

The ICC has issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant in connection with the court’s investigation into the situation in Palestine.

The United States has strongly rejected the court’s jurisdiction over Israeli officials and has responded with sanctions against ICC personnel.

Washington argues that the court has no legitimate authority over US or Israeli nationals in the relevant circumstances. Supporters of the ICC counter that international criminal law is weakened if powerful states can prevent judicial scrutiny simply by rejecting the court’s authority.

The confrontation therefore goes to the heart of one of the ICC’s most difficult questions: how can an international court enforce accountability when some of the world’s strongest governments refuse to recognise its jurisdiction?

The ICC has always had a sovereignty problem

The court was created as a tribunal of last resort under the Rome Statute, which entered into force in 2002. It prosecutes individuals, not governments, for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression under its jurisdiction.

Its underlying principle is known as complementarity. National courts retain primary responsibility for prosecuting serious international crimes, while the ICC becomes involved when domestic authorities are unwilling or genuinely unable to conduct credible proceedings.

That model was designed to balance international accountability with national sovereignty.

In practice, however, the boundary is difficult. Governments accused of abuses may insist that their domestic institutions are capable of handling the matter, while prosecutors and victims may argue that national justice systems cannot provide an independent investigation.

The sovereignty dispute is therefore built into the ICC’s design rather than being a temporary political problem.

Ukraine shows that the court can still attract new members

Despite the recent withdrawals, the ICC has also expanded its membership.

Ukraine became the 125th state party on January 1, 2025, after ratifying the Rome Statute. The move was particularly significant because the ICC had already been investigating alleged crimes connected to the conflict in Ukraine after receiving referrals from member states.

Ukraine’s decision to join formally was an explicit expression of support for international accountability. Its government argued that those responsible for the gravest crimes should not be able to avoid justice.

The contrast is striking. While several states are moving away from the court, another country at the centre of a major international conflict decided to become a full participant.

This suggests that the ICC’s political future cannot be understood solely through the number of withdrawals.

The court still has 125 member states for now

Even after the announced departures, the ICC’s membership remains extensive.

The Rome Statute has attracted countries across Africa, Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific. The institution’s legal framework therefore continues to have broad international support.

The bigger concern is whether that support is strong enough to withstand pressure when membership becomes politically costly.

Iva Vukuic of Utrecht University has framed the issue in those terms: countries may support the ICC in principle, but the real test comes when defending it could damage their relationships with powerful states.

That is the credibility test now facing the court.

What the withdrawals mean for victims

For victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious offences, the consequences of weakened international cooperation could be significant.

The ICC has always depended heavily on governments for evidence, arrests, witness protection, funding and access to territory. It does not have its own police force capable of independently executing arrest warrants around the world.

When states refuse to cooperate, even a legally valid warrant can remain unenforced.

More withdrawals could make that problem worse by reducing the number of governments willing to assist investigations and execute warrants.

The court can continue legal proceedings without a state party in some circumstances, but the practical ability to collect evidence and bring suspects before judges is heavily dependent on international cooperation.

Why the current crisis is different from earlier disputes

The ICC has survived criticism before. What makes the current period unusually difficult is the combination of several pressures at the same time.

The United States is actively campaigning for withdrawals. Multiple governments have begun leaving. A major prosecutor has been removed. The court remains involved in politically sensitive cases involving Israel, Palestine, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Venezuela and other situations.

At the same time, the international system itself is becoming more fragmented, with governments increasingly prioritising national sovereignty over universal institutional rules.

That creates a difficult Environment for any court that depends on states to enforce its decisions.

Could more countries leave?

The biggest question now is whether the five recent withdrawals represent a temporary wave or the beginning of a broader erosion of ICC membership.

The answer will depend heavily on how governments calculate the costs of remaining inside the Rome Statute system.

States facing US pressure may reconsider their membership if they believe the diplomatic or economic costs of supporting the ICC are rising. Others may choose to remain precisely because they see international accountability as more important when geopolitical divisions are deepening.

The decisions of larger democracies could be particularly important. If major European or Latin American states publicly defend the ICC and strengthen cooperation, they could help stabilise the institution. If additional countries follow the current withdrawal trend, the political pressure could become much harder to contain.

The ICC’s future depends on cooperation, not just membership numbers

The court’s long-term survival cannot be measured solely by counting states on the membership list.

Its effectiveness ultimately depends on whether member governments provide funding, share evidence, enforce warrants and defend the principle of judicial independence.

A court with many members but weak cooperation can struggle to prosecute powerful suspects. Conversely, a court with fewer members but strong backing from key states could continue to play an important role in international justice.

This is why the current crisis is as much about political will as treaty membership.

A test of whether international justice can withstand geopolitical pressure

The International Criminal Court is entering a decisive period. The United States is openly encouraging countries to leave, five states have announced withdrawals, and the court is replacing its chief prosecutor while continuing some of the most politically sensitive investigations in its history.

Yet the institution is not collapsing. Its legal jurisdiction survives in important cases, Ukraine’s accession demonstrates continued support, and existing investigations involving departing states can continue under the Rome Statute’s rules.

The real danger is slower and more structural: a gradual reduction in cooperation that makes the court increasingly difficult to enforce.

For the ICC, the coming months will therefore be about more than preventing additional withdrawals. It will be about persuading governments that international criminal justice remains worth defending even when doing so carries political costs.

For the United States and governments critical of the court, the dispute is fundamentally about sovereignty and the limits of international judicial power. For victims and supporters of the ICC, it is about whether the world’s gravest crimes can be investigated regardless of the political status of those accused.

The clash between those two visions is now shaping the future of the ICC itself. The recent exits have deepened the crisis, but they have not ended the court’s work. Whether the institution emerges weakened, reformed or more firmly backed by its remaining members will depend on what governments do next.