India China Economic Growth: India Grows Faster Than China

china remains the overwhelming economic force inside BRICS, but a closer look at the past five years reveals an important shift: India has grown faster than China on the aggregate income measure used in a recent analysis by economist Surjit Bhalla.

The distinction matters because two different stories can be true at the same time. India can grow considerably faster than China without coming close to matching China’s economic size. China’s much larger starting base means even a slower percentage increase can translate into a far greater addition to total income.

Bhalla’s analysis of BRICS highlights precisely that tension. Over the longer period from 2011 to 2025, China accounted for most of the increase in the economic weight of the grouping. But the figures for 2020 to 2025 show India beginning to narrow the relative gap, albeit only modestly.

The numbers therefore do not point to an India-China economic crossover. They point to something more measured: India is growing from a much smaller base at a faster pace, while China remains the dominant contributor to the overall economic size of BRICS.

China drove most of BRICS’ economic rise

Bhalla’s calculations show that BRICS’ share of global income increased from 21.9% in 2011 to 28.9% in 2025. At first glance, that suggests a powerful collective rise for the grouping.

But removing China produces a very different picture.

The other 10 members accounted for 11.9% of global income in 2011, compared with 11.5% in 2025. In other words, their combined share actually declined slightly even as BRICS as a whole gained substantially.

China alone accounted for about 72% of the increase in BRICS’ income over the period, according to Bhalla’s analysis.

That finding illustrates why BRICS cannot be treated as an economically balanced bloc. The grouping contains several large emerging economies, but China’s scale gives it a disproportionate influence over aggregate numbers.

China’s share of BRICS income rose from 45.6% in 2011 to 60.2% in 2025. Among the five original long-standing members, its share increased from 54.1% to 68.9%.

That shift has strategic implications. When the economic weight of one member grows much faster than that of the rest, the collective strength of the group can increasingly reflect the performance of its largest Economy.

India’s growth story looks stronger after 2020

The picture becomes more interesting when the analysis is narrowed to the five years from 2020 to 2025.

Bhalla uses GNI per capita calculated through the World Bank’s Atlas method and multiplies it by population to estimate aggregate income. GNI, or gross national income, measures income earned by residents and businesses, including income received from abroad. It differs from GDP, which measures economic activity taking place within a country’s borders.

Using this methodology, India’s aggregate GNI increased from roughly $2.67 trillion in 2020 to about $4.04 trillion in 2025. That represents an increase of approximately 52%.

China’s aggregate GNI increased from around $15.15 trillion to $20.02 trillion over the same period, equivalent to growth of roughly 32%.

On this particular measure, India therefore expanded about 20 percentage points faster than China between 2020 and 2025.

That is a significant difference in growth rates. But it needs to be interpreted alongside the enormous difference in economic size between the two countries.

India is growing faster, but China remains far larger

The easiest way to misunderstand the figures is to interpret faster growth as evidence that India is close to overtaking China economically.

It is not.

China’s aggregate GNI was still around five times India’s in 2025 under the measure used in the analysis.

The difference becomes even clearer when looking at the absolute increase in income. China added approximately $4.86 trillion to its aggregate GNI between 2020 and 2025. India added around $1.37 trillion.

China therefore increased its income by a much larger dollar amount even though its percentage growth was substantially lower.

This is a basic but important feature of economic growth. A smaller economy can expand at a faster percentage rate while a much larger economy continues to add more money in absolute terms.

For example, a 50% increase in a $3 trillion economy produces $1.5 trillion of additional income. A 30% increase in a $15 trillion economy produces $4.5 trillion. The growth rate tells one story; the starting base tells another.

India’s recent performance should therefore be understood as evidence of faster expansion, not evidence that the economic gap with China has disappeared.

The India-China gap has narrowed only slightly

There has nevertheless been a change in the relative size of the two economies.

In 2020, India’s aggregate GNI was approximately 18% of China’s. By 2025, it had risen to around 20%.

That is a relatively small movement, but it is meaningful when viewed over a five-year period.

It suggests that sustained faster growth can gradually alter the balance even when the starting gap is enormous. If India maintains a higher growth rate for a sufficiently long period, its economic weight will continue to rise relative to China.

But the reverse is also true: a modest difference in growth rates is not enough to eliminate a gap of this size quickly.

The implication is that India’s challenge is not simply to grow faster than China for a few years. It is to maintain a high rate of expansion for a much longer period while increasing productivity, employment, investment and its share of global trade.

India was already a strong BRICS performer over the longer term

The five-year comparison also fits into a broader pattern identified by Bhalla.

Between 2011 and 2025, India was described as the second-best performer among the five long-standing BRICS members, with annual income growth of around 5.2% under the methodology used in the analysis.

India’s share of global income increased from approximately 2.5% in 2011 to 3.5% in 2025.

That increase is substantial, but it also highlights the scale of the task ahead. Moving from 2.5% to 3.5% of global income represents meaningful progress, yet it still leaves India with a relatively modest share of the world economy compared with its population and its ambitions to become a larger global economic power.

The recent five-year figures provide another reason for optimism: India has been expanding faster than China on the aggregate GNI measure.

Whether that advantage can be maintained is the more important question.

Why China’s dominance still matters for BRICS

India’s faster recent growth does not change the fundamental structure of BRICS.

China remains the largest economy in the group by a wide margin and contributes substantially more to its aggregate economic output and income. That gives Beijing considerable economic weight within the organisation.

It also affects how BRICS looks from outside. A growing share of the group’s economic power is concentrated in China, even as India and other members expand.

This matters because BRICS is increasingly presented as a platform for emerging and developing economies seeking greater influence in global institutions and international economic affairs. The bloc’s collective bargaining power depends partly on the economic size of its members, but internal balance also matters.

A BRICS dominated economically by China can behave differently from a grouping in which India, Brazil, Russia, South Africa and the newer members carry more comparable weight.

India’s growth therefore has significance beyond its own GDP or GNI. A larger Indian economy could eventually give New Delhi greater influence over the economic priorities and strategic direction of the grouping.

Trade is where India still faces a major challenge

Income growth is only one part of the story. Bhalla’s analysis of global goods exports shows why India cannot rely on faster domestic expansion alone if it wants to substantially increase its economic weight.

BRICS’ share of global goods exports increased from 23% in 2011 to 25% in 2023. But when China is excluded, the combined share of the other members fell from 12.4% to 10.1%.

China accounted for approximately 94% of the increase in BRICS goods exports during that period, according to the analysis.

India’s own share of global goods exports rose from 1.71% in 2011 to 1.88% in 2023. That is an improvement, but it is much smaller than the gains achieved by some other Asian manufacturing economies.

Vietnam, for example, increased its share from 0.52% to 1.50% over the same period.

This comparison highlights an important weakness in India’s economic story. The country has achieved faster income growth, but translating that growth into a much larger presence in global merchandise trade remains difficult.

GNI is useful, but it is not the same as real GDP growth

The methodology behind the comparison deserves particular attention.

The analysis uses GNI under the World Bank Atlas method, rather than real GDP growth. The Atlas method converts national-income figures into US dollars using a formula designed to smooth short-term exchange-rate fluctuations through a multi-year conversion factor.

Because the figures are expressed in current US dollars, changes can reflect more than changes in the physical volume of economic activity. Exchange rates, prices, population and income earned from abroad can all affect the resulting number.

That means the 52% increase in India’s aggregate GNI between 2020 and 2025 should not be interpreted as saying that India’s real economy physically expanded by 52%.

The measure is valuable for comparing the changing income scale of countries using a consistent methodology, but it answers a different question from a standard real-GDP growth comparison.

This distinction is particularly important when comparing countries with very different currencies, Inflation patterns and economic structures.

What the numbers say about India’s BRICS future

The latest figures produce a more nuanced picture of India’s position inside BRICS.

India is not replacing China as the economic centre of the grouping. China remains vastly larger and continues to account for the majority of BRICS’ economic weight and much of its expansion.

At the same time, India is no longer simply a secondary story inside the bloc. Its faster recent income growth means its relative economic weight is increasing.

The next stage will depend on whether India can turn faster growth into broader economic influence. That requires more than headline growth rates. Manufacturing competitiveness, exports, Infrastructure, investment, productivity, human capital and integration into global supply chains will all influence how much of India’s growth translates into international economic power.

The trade numbers suggest there is still considerable ground to cover. India’s modest increase in global goods-export share contrasts with the much larger gains achieved by China and some other Asian economies.

That makes the distinction between growing faster and becoming larger central to understanding the India-China economic contest.

India has clearly grown faster than China over the past five years under the GNI measure used by Bhalla. But China started from such a much larger base that it still added substantially more income in absolute terms.

For BRICS, that leaves the bloc with a dominant China and an increasingly important India. The economic balance is changing, but slowly. India’s recent growth advantage matters because sustained differences compound over time. Whether that advantage eventually becomes a much larger shift in the balance of BRICS economic power will depend on how long India can sustain it and how effectively it converts growth into trade, investment and global economic influence.